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FORMULATION AND APPLICATION OF THE
TAx BENEFIT RULE: HILLSBORO
NATIONAL BANK V. COMMISSIONER
HE decision in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner reflects
the United States Supreme Court's consolidation of two cases:
Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner and United States v. Bliss
Dairy, Inc. Since the underlying facts in each case are different, they are
set out separately.
HILLsBoRo NATIONAL BANK V COMMISSIONER
Until 1970 the State of Illinois assessed a property tax on shares held by
stockholders of incorporated banks.' Banks customarily paid the tax on
behalf of the shareholders and took a deduction for the payments.2 In
1970 the Illinois Legislature amended the state constitution to prohibit ad
valorem taxation of personal property owned by individuals.3 The amend-
ment was soon challenged as a violation of the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution,4 so the legislature directed that the tax be
collected and placed in escrow 5 pending a decision on the constitutionality
Editor's Note: Unless otherwise indicated all statutory references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, which is codified in title 26 of the United States Code.
Internal Revenue Code sections are cited to the 1976 permanent edition and/or current
supplement of the United States Code, if therein. Otherwise, code sections are cited to the
main edition and/or current supplement of the United States Code Annotated published by
West Publishing Company. All Treasury Regulations are cited by section number and may
be found in 26 C.F.R. (1983) unless otherwise indicated.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 557 (Smith-Hurd 1970) (repealed 1982).
2. I.R.C. § 164(e) (1976) provides:
Where a corporation pays a tax imposed on a shareholder on his interest as a
shareholder, and where the shareholder does not reimburse the corporation,
then-
(1) the deduction allowed by subsection (a) shall be allowed to the corpo-
ration; and
(2) no deduction shall be allowed the shareholder for such tax.
3. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX-A (1970). "Ad valorem" taxation is a tax laid in the
form of a percentage on the value of the property. See Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 74
P.2d 47, 50 (1937).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Illinois Supreme Court held the amendment
unconstitutional in Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d 137, 273 N.E.2d 592, 599
(1971).
5. Pub. Act 77-2133, § 1, 1972 Ill. Laws 942 (codified as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
§ 676.01) (repealed 1982).
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of the amendment by the United States Supreme Court. Hillsboro Na-
tional Bank paid the required taxes for 1972 and took the corresponding
deduction. After the United States Supreme Court upheld the amendment
prohibiting such taxation,6 the amounts in escrow, with accrued interest,
were refunded directly to the shareholders. 7 Hillsboro did not include the
refund in income on its 1973 tax return, and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue assessed a deficiency against the bank for the amount of the re-
fund. The Tax Court held that the refund of taxes to the shareholders
must be included in Hillsboro's 1973 income.8 The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 9 and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Held, reversed: The tax benefit rule does not require
that a corporation include in income any refund of taxes to shareholders
when the corporation, in an earlier year, has paid the tax for the share-
holders and taken a corresponding deduction. Hillsboro National Bank v.
Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 75 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1983).
UNITED STATES V BLISS DAR1, INC.
Bliss Dairy, Inc. was operated as a closely held corporation until 1973.
During that year the dairy deducted the full cost of cattle feed purchased,
even though a substantial portion of the feed was still on hand at the end
of the taxable year. After one day of operation in the next tax year, Bliss
adopted a plan of liquidation and distributed all of its assets to its share-
holders. The assets distributed included a substantial portion of the cattle
feed purchased for use in its business and expensed in the previous year. 10
Bliss did not report the distribution as income, relying on the nonrecogni-
tion provisions of section 336 of the Internal Revenue Code. " The share-
holders continued to operate the dairy in noncorporate form and filed an
election under section 333 to limit the gain recognized by the shareholders
on liquidation. 12 The shareholders' basis in the corporation's stock was
6. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364-65 (1973).
7. Hillsboro National Bank was not notified of the refunds, which the County Treas-
urer sent directly to the shareholders.
8. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 61, 68 (1979). The court did find
that the portion of the refunds representing accrued interest was not includable in the bank's
income. Id at 71.
9. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981).
10. Bliss Dairy was a cash basis taxpayer and as such properly deducted the expense
when paid. A cash basis taxpayer computes income by deducting actual cash expenditures
in a given accounting period from actual cash receipts instead of allocating receipts and
disbursements to the accounting period in which earned or incurred. 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 12.01, at 6 (rev. ed. 1982). The deduction was allowed under
I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 1978 & Supp. 1983), which allows a deduction for all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business.
11. I.R.C. § 336 (West Supp. 1983). Section 336 provides that "no gain or loss shall be
recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property in complete liquidation." Id
§ 336(a).
12. Id. § 333 (1976). Section 333, in general, limits the gain recognized by qualified
electing shareholders when the liquidation is made pursuant to an adopted plan and the
distribution of all property occurs within one calendar month. A shareholder recognizes
ordinary income on the liquidating distribution to the extent of his ratable share of the
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allocated among the assets received,1 3 including the cattle feed. 14 The
shareholders then deducted their new basis in the feed as a business ex-
pense for the 1973 tax year.' 5 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue in-
creased Bliss's corporate income for 1973 by $60,000, asserting that the
value of the grain distributed to the shareholders should have been in-
cluded in income.' 6 Bliss paid the tax assessment and sued for a refund.
The district court granted Bliss's motion for summary judgment, and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.17 Held, reversed and re-
manded: The tax benefit rule overrides the nonrecognition provision in
section 336 and requires the inclusion in income of a previous deduction
when events occur that are fundamentally inconsistent with that earlier
deduction. Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 75
L. Ed. 2d 130 (1983).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
The tax benefit rule provides that the recovery of an amount previously
deducted is income in the year recovered.' 8 In order for the rule to apply,
the taxpayer must have taken a deduction that resulted in a tax benefit. 19
The inclusionary and exclusionary components of the rule are examined to
determine the taxability of such recovery. 20 Under the exclusionary aspect
of the rule, any recovery not previously resulting in a tax benefit is ex-
corporation's earnings and profits. Id § 333(a), (c). Additional gain to the extent the value
of money, stock, or securities received on liquidation exceeds his ratable share of the corpo-
ration's earnings and profits is recognized as capital gain. Any remaining gain is not recog-
nized. Id § 333(e).
13. When a shareholder receives several assets in liquidation he apportions his total
basis among all the assets according to their relative fair market values. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-
2.
14. The record did not disclose the precise amount of basis that the shareholders allo-
cated to the unused cattle feed. The parties agreed, however, that the shareholders received
a stepped-up basis in the feed, since the deduction taken in 1973 had reduced the basis of the
feed to zero.
15. I.R.C. § 162 (1976).
16. The unconsumed cattle feed was later determined to have a value of $56,565.
17. Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The
court relied on its prior decision in Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837
(9th Cir. 1963), and rejected a conflicting decision in the Sixth Circuit, Tennessee-Carolina
Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909
(1979).
18. See, e.g., First Trust & Sav. Bank v. United States, 614 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir.
1980); Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130, 1132 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972); 1 J. MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.34, at 114-21 (rev. ed. 1981).
19. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 3 (1970) ("recovery of an item that has
produced an income tax benefit in a prior year is to be added to income in the year of
recovery"); Rosen v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 942, 943 (1st Cir. 1980) (charitable deduction);
Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 402 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (charitable
contribution of real property); Lime Cola Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 593, 601 (1954)
(deduction for defective purchase); Birmingham Terminal Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.
10 11, 1013 (1951) (railroad retirement losses reimbursed by government).
20. For a detailed discussion of both the inclusionary and exclusionary elements of the
rule, see Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265, 272-81 (1978);
O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Beneft
Rule in the Taxation of Corporation and Shareholders, 27 TAX L. REV. 215 (1972).
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cluded from income, whereas under the inclusionary component any re-
covery of a previous benefit must be included in income.2'
The tax benefit rule was initially developed by the courts.22 Congress
codified the exclusionary element of the tax benefit rule in section
22(b)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,23 which became section
111 of the 1954 Code. 24 Although section 111 expressly addresses only the
exclusionary aspect of the rule, several courts have interpreted the section
as an implied ratification of the inclusionary element of the rule.25 In de-
fining the amount of a recovery that is excluded from income, section 11
refers only to bad debts, prior taxes, and delinquency amounts as falling
within the rule's tax benefit treatment. Treasury Regulations, however,
have broadened the categories of deductions that must be recouped under
the rule to include all losses or expenditures, 26 and courts now commonly
21. See Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 333, 343 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147, 1149 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, 664 n.10 (1976),
aft'd, 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979); Birmingham Terminal Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.
1011, 1013 (1951); South Dakota Concrete Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1429,
1432 (1932).
22. See, e.g., Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 506 (1943) (sale of stock re-
scinded); Unvert v. Commissioner, 656 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1981) (interest deduction),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982); National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d
875, 877 (9th Cir. 1940) (bad debt deduction); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Rothensies, 43 F.
Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (bad debt deduction); Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United
States, 381 F.2d 399, 402 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (charitable contribution); Capitol Coal Corp. v.
Commissioner, 26 T.C. 1183, 1195 (1956) (cancellation of debt), aft'd, 250 F.2d 361 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958); Estate of Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338,
341-42 (1939) (deduction for tax payment), afdsub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940).
23. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 22(b)(12).
24. I.R.C. § 111 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 111 provides:
(a) General Rule.
Gross income does not include income attributable to the recovery during
the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax, or delinquency amount, to the extent
of the amount of the recovery exclusion with respect to such debt, tax, or
amount.
(b) Definitions.
For purposes of subsection (a)-
(4) Recovery exclusion.
The term "recovery exclusion", with respect to a bad debt, prior tax, or
delinquency amount, means the amount, determined in accordance with regu-
lations prescribed by the Secretary, of the deductions or credits allowed, on
account of such bad debt, prior tax, or delinquency amount, which did not
result in a reduction of the taxpayer's tax under this subtitle. . . , reduced by
the amount excludable in previous taxable years with respect to such debt, tax,
or amount under this section.
Id. § I lI(a)-(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
25. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 505-06 (1943); Alice Phelan Sullivan
Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 402 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 652, 664 n.10 (1976), a~fd, 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979); Bittker & Kanner, supra note
20, at 271-72.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1. 111 - I. The regulation states, however, that deductions for deprecia-
tion, depletion, amortization, and amortizable bond premiums are not subject to the recov-
ery exclusion. Id § 1.111-1(a).
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apply the rule beyond the items listed in section 111. 27 Under the rule,
therefore, the recovery of any item that reduced tax liability in a previous
year may represent taxable income in the year of recovery.
28
The tax benefit rule furthers the effectiveness of the annual accounting
system. 29 Without the rule, a taxpayer could abuse the accounting princi-
ple that transactions be treated as final at year end so that tax conse-
quences can be determined and reported.30 For example, the propriety of
a particular deduction may be affected by changed circumstances if the
transaction spans several years. Because the taxpayer has taken a deduc-
tion that would not have been allowed had the recovery occurred in the
same year,31 he has gained an advantage over a taxpayer who engaged in a
similar transaction where both events occurred in a single year. The tax
benefit rule is intended to alleviate some of these inequities by according
similar tax treatment to transactions that span more than one accounting
period. 32
Courts applying the tax benefit rule have encountered difficulty in deter-
mining what type of event in a later year requires an adjustment in in-
come. The decisions are not entirely consistent, and the conflicting
conclusions drawn by the circuit courts have been the subject of several
legal commentaries.33 In applying the rule, the circuit courts follow one of
two theories, the inconsistent event theory34 or the recovery theory.35 The
27. See, e.g., Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130, 1133 (3d Cir. 1972) (recovery of
advertising expense deduction); Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 622, 623
(5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (deductions of accrued utility rate refunds); Bishop v. United
States, 324 F. Supp. 1105, 1111 (M.D. Ga. 1971) (sale of breeder hens fully deducted); S.E.
Evans, Inc. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 423, 426-27 (W.D. Ark. 1970) (sale of previously
expensed parts and supplies).
28. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 3 (1970) (deduction for estimated bad debts).
29. Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 333, 343 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975)
(Tannenwald, J., concurring).
30. Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 333, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
31. See Bishop v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1105, 1111 (M.D. Ga. 1971); Mayfair
Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 86 (1971), affdper curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th
Cir. 1972).
32. See Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 333, 344 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975)
(Tannenwald, J., concurring); South Dakota Concrete Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 26
B.T.A. 1429, 1432 (1932). See generally Bittker & Kanner, supra note 20, at 267-70.
33. Epstein, The Tax Benfit Rule in Corporate Liquidations, 6 TAX ADVISER 454, 456-57
(1975); Feld, The Tax Benefit of Bliss, 62 B.U.L. REV. 443, 451-54 (1982); Forte, Corporate
Liquidations-Sections 336 and 337 of the Internal Revenue Code-Parity Between a Direct
Sale ofAssets and a Stock Purchase-Another Look at Tennessee-Carolina and R.M. Smith,
3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 199, 215-21 (1980); Morrison, Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit
Principles in Corporate Liquidations, 54 TAXES 902, 903-04 (1976); Reveley & Pratt, Tax
Benfit Rule." What Constitutes a Recovery? Sixth and Ninth Circuits Disagree, 57 TAXES
416, 417-18 (1979); Note, The Tax Benefit Rule and Corporate Liquidations: Baiting the "Trap
for the Unwary," 4 J. CORP. L. 681, 692-703 (1979).
34. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1981); First
Trust & Say. Bank v. United States, 614 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1980); Rosen v. Com-
missioner, 611 F.2d 942, 943-44 (1st Cir. 1980); Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 582 F.2d 378, 382-88 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); Estate of
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inconsistent event theory, first enunciated in Estate of Block v. Commis-
sioner,36 maintains that "[wjhen recovery or some other event which is
inconsistent with what has been done in the past occurs, adjustment must
be made in reporting income for the year in which the change occurs."'37
In Block the estate received a large tax refund as a result of an amendment
in the state inheritance laws. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained a defi-
ciency against the estate and required the estate's executor to include the
refund of estate taxes in income in the year recovered. 38 The Board rea-
soned that if the adjustment were not made the estate would have received
the refund tax-free. 39
The Sixth Circuit adopted and elaborated on the inconsistent event the-
ory in Tennessee- Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner.40 The tax-
payer in that case purchased all the capital stock of Service Lines, Inc.
Service Lines temporarily operated as a subsidiary and then liquidated
and merged into its parent, Tennessee-Carolina Transportation Company.
Pursuant to the liquidation, all the assets of the subsidiary were distributed
to the parent, including previously expensed tires and tubes. The parent
company allocated the purchase price of the stock to the newly acquired
assets based on relative fair market values. 41 The company then deducted
the amount allocated to the tires and tubes as a business expense on its
consolidated income tax return. The court of appeals held that the parent
was required to include the value of the distributed tires and tubes in the
subsidiary's income.42 The court stated that the tax benefit rule applied to
corporate liquidations under section 336 of the Code43 and that an incon-
sistent event sufficient to invoke the tax benefit rule occurred when the
parent received the previously expensed tires and tubes with a stepped-up
Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338, 341-43 (1939), af'd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, Il1 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940).
35. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only circuit court that has followed this
theory. See Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111, 114 (9th Cir. 1966); Commissioner v.
South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1963). The theory has also been fol-
lowed, however, by a district court in the Tenth Circuit in Ballou Constr. Co. v. United
States, 526 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (D. Kan. 1981), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hillsboro
Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 75 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1983).
36. 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), affldsub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, Il l F.2d 60
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940).
37. 39 B.T.A. at 341.
38. Id at 340. The estate had paid and deducted federal estate taxes from 1929 to 1931.
The taxes were determined after allowing a credit for estate taxes paid to the State of Indi-
ana. When the Indiana inheritance tax laws were amended in 1931 the estate's tax liability
increased and the estate was thereby entitled to a larger credit against its federal estate tax
liability. After receiving a refund from the IRS for the overpayment and interest, the estate
reported only the interest as income on its 1932 tax return.
39. Id. at 340.
40. 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
41. Id at 380. The allocation was made in accordance with I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976)
(current version at id (West Supp. 1983)).
42. 582 F.2d at 383.
43. Id at 380. The court expressly rejected the contrary holding of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Id at 380 n.13; see Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d
837, 839 (9th Cir. 1963) (tax benefit rule inapplicable to § 336 corporate liquidations).
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basis.44 Alternatively, the court held that even if an actual recovery is nec-
essary to invoke the rule, such a recovery had occurred in this case. 45 Fo-
cusing on the transfer of the assets to the parent corporation, the court
further held that the subsidiary experienced an instantaneous recovery at
the moment it transferred fully expensed assets to its parent for value.46
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently followed the Ten-
nessee-Carolina decision in First Trust & Savings Bank v. United States.47
The First Trust case arose out of the same series of events that initiated
Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner. In First Trust, however, the In-
ternal Revenue Service sent the refunds to the bank as a joint payee with
the shareholders, and the bank forwarded the checks to the individual
stockholders. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the event suffi-
ciently inconsistent with the prior deduction to invoke the tax benefit
rule.48 The court refused to impose liability in the absence of an actual
recovery, but found that such a recovery occurred when the bank received
the refunds before distributing them to the shareholders. 49
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a different view of the applica-
tion of the tax benefit rule, using the recovery theory in Commissioner v.
South Lake Farms, Inc. -0 After planting crops and expensing the costs of
production of the crops, South Lake Farms, Inc. was purchased by another
corporation and subsequently liquidated. The acquiring corporation cal-
culated its basis in the crops by reference to the price of the stock,5' and
subsequently included sales of the crop in income, while deducting the
costs of harvesting as an expense. The Internal Revenue Service unsuc-
cessfully argued that the taxpayer must include either the value of the
crops or the original expense deduction as income. The court held that
South Lake had received no recovery and that the tax benefit rule did not
override the provisions of section 336.52
Another disagreement between the circuits centers on the treatment of
gains on property distributed in a liquidation 53 and, in particular, on
44. 582 F.2d at 382.
45. Id The court ruled that when the tubes and tires were fully deducted by Service
Lines they were, so far as the law contemplated, consumed. Id.
46. Id.
47. 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980).
48. Id at 1146.
49. Id. The Seventh Circuit further extended the inconsistent event theory in Hillsboro
Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981).
50. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
51. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976) (current version at id (West Supp. 1983)). Section
334(b)(2) provides that the basis of property received by a corporation in a complete liquida-
tion of another corporation is equal to the adjusted basis of the stock in the liquidated corpo-
ration. Id
52. 324 F.2d at 839; see I.R.C. § 336 (West Supp. 1983). Although the IRS objected to
the decision in Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106, 107, the Ninth Circuit subsequently reaf-
firmed South Lake Farms in Bliss Dairy v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
53. This disagreement is also the result of the conflicting decisions between the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits in Tennessee-Carolina and South Lake Farms. See generally Note, Tax
19841 NOTES 1015
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
whether section 336 should be treated like section 33754 under the tax ben-
efit rule."5 When previously expensed property is sold in a corporate liqui-
dation, the tax benefit rule overrides the nonrecognition provisions of
section 337, resulting in inclusion of the gain in income.56 In discussing
the treatment to be accorded section 336, both commentators5 7 and
courts5 have urged parity between sections 336 and 337. In order to re-
solve the conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Bliss and Hillsboro .9
II. HILLSBORO NATIONAL BANK v. COMMISSIONER
In the consolidated cases of Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner
and United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. the United States Supreme Court
considered the applicability of the tax benefit rule in two separate corpo-
rate tax situations. The Court held that the tax benefit rule requires addi-
tions to income for recoveries when events occur that are fundamentally
inconsistent with an earlier deduction, unless a nonrecognition provision
of the Internal Revenue Code prevails over the tax benefit rule.60 The
holding resulted in the recognition of income from the liquidation in Bliss
Dairy, but no recognition of income from the tax refunds in Hillsboro Na-
tional Bank.6' The majority opinion, written by Justice O'Connor,62 first
Treatment of Previously Expensed Assets in Corporate Liquidations, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1636,
1646-52 (1982) (nonrecognition of gains under I.R.C. § 336 (West Supp. 1983)).
54. I.R.C. § 337 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983). Section 337 deals with the sale or exchange
of corporate assets in a liquidation rather than distribution as under id § 336 (West Supp.
1983). It provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss from the sale or exchange of corporate
assets if all assets are distributed within a 12-month period. Id § 337(a) (1976).
55. See generally Epstein, supra note 33 (origin and application of § 336 and § 337);
Feld, supra note 33 (nonrecognition provision in § 336 should be overridden by tax benefit
rule); Morrison, supra note 33 (parity of treatment between § 336 and § 337 transactions);
O'Hare, supra note 20 (detailed discussion of application of tax benefit rule to § 336 and
§ 337); Note, supra note 33 (comparing § 336 and § 337 liquidations); Note, supra note 53
(advocating recognition of gains under § 336 through tax benefit rule).
56. O'Hare, supra note 20, at 226. Several courts have upheld the tax benefit rule in
such situations. See Citizens' Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir.
1972); Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130, 1134 (3d Cir. 1972); Spitalny v. United
States, 430 F.2d 195, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283, 1287
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969); West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288
F.2d 47, 50 (9th Cir. 1961); Bishop v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1105, 1111 (M.D. Ga.
1971); S.E. Evans, Inc. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 423, 425-26 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Estate
of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 676-77 (1975); Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d
1147, 1149 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 290 F.2d 932, 936-37 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
57. Epstein, supra note 33, at 458; Feld, supra note 33, at 459; Morrison, supra note 33,
at 919; Note, supra note 33, at 702-03; Note, supra note 53, at 1654.
58. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 677
(1975).
59. The Supreme Court had previously addressed the tax benefit rule in two cases,
neither of which involved a nonrecognition provision of the Code. See Nash v. United
States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
60. 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1138, 75 L. Ed. 2d 130, 139 (1983).
61. Id at 1154, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 158.
62. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined the opinion
of the Court.
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discussed the importance of the annual accounting system and the judi-
cially developed tax benefit rule. Emphasizing that the purpose of the rule
was not simply to tax recoveries, but "to approximate the results produced
by a tax system based on transactional rather than annual accounting," the
Court rejected the formulations of the tax benefit rule advanced by both
the taxpayers and the government. 63 The taxpayers contended that the
rule required an actual recovery in later years, but the Court concluded
that an actual recovery requirement would not serve the purposes of the
rule.64 The government had urged that the rule is invoked when an event
occurs "which eliminates the factual premise upon which the deduction
was originally claimed. ' 65 The majority determined, however, that al-
though an unforeseen event that proves an earlier deduction erroneous
may require the application of the tax benefit rule, that result is not inevi-
table.66 The Court stated that proper application of the tax benefit rule
requires that it be invoked to cancel out an earlier deduction only when
"tl1e later event is fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which
the deduction was initially based. ' 67 The Court, therefore, distinguished
between unexpected events, which do not necessarily invoke the rule, and
inconsistent events, which do.68 The majority considered its formulation
of the tax benefit rule clearly consistent with earlier cases establishing the
rule.69 The Court noted that in Estate of Block v. Commissioner 70 and
other cases 7' the later events that had been used to invoke the rule were
often characterized as inconsistent.72 The majority also stated that the ap-
63. 103 S. Ct. at 1142, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 144.
64. Id at 1143, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 145. The Court viewed the tax benefit rule as a method
"to achieve rough transactional parity in tax." Id Therefore, application of the rule only in
the event of an actual recovery is not sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the rule. Every
subsequent event necessitating an income adjustment to achieve tax parity will not occur as
an actual recovery. Id at 1143-44, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 145-46.
65. Brief for the Commissioner and the United States at 20.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 1144, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 146. As an example of an unforeseen event that
does not invoke the application of the rule, the Court postulated the following example: A
company prepays a month's rent on December 15, 19XI. The company takes a deduction
on its 19XI tax return for the entire amount. On January 10, 19X2 the leased premises are
destroyed by fire. Id
67. Id.
68. Id Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the majority's distinction between "funda-
mentally inconsistent events" and "inconsistent events" created a hybrid standard of the rule
that is, at best, a vague guideline. Id at 1161, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 167. The majority, however,
countered this objection with the proposition that the application of the tax benefit rule turns
upon the difference between unexpected and inconsistent events. Id at 1143 n.15, 75 L. Ed.
2d at 146 n.15.
69. Id at 1145, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 148.
70. 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), affdsub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940).
71. Barnett v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 864, 867 (1939) ("When some event occurs
which is inconsistent with a deduction taken in a prior year, adjustment may have to be
made by reporting a balancing item in income for the year in which the change occurs.");
South Dakota Concrete Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1429, 1432 (1932) ("[W]hen
an adjustment occurs which is inconsistent with what has been done in the past in the deter-
mination of tax liability, the adjustment should be reflected in reporting income for the year
in which it occurs.").
72. 103 S. Ct. at 1145, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 148. Justice Stevens, however, argued that all the
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proach taken in Hillsboro and Bliss conformed to the Court's latest consid-
eration of the tax benefit rule in Nash v. United States .73 Finally, the Court
emphasized that the tax benefit rule must be applied on a case-by-case
basis, considering in each instance the purpose and function of the Code
provisions allowing the original deductions.74
Turning to the effect of nonrecognition provisions on the tax benefit
rule, the majority noted that when the later event is within a nonrecogni-
tion provision of the Code there is "inherent tension" between the tax ben-
efit rule and the nonrecognition provision.75 The Court again refused to
adopt a standard rule, emphasizing that the decision to apply the rule turns
upon a determination of whether the deductions taken were inconsistent
with later events and whether nonrecognition provisions prevail over the
tax benefit rule.76
In applying these rulings to Hillsboro, the Court focused on the intent of
Congress in granting corporations a deduction under section 164(e). 77 The
majority found that Congress was concerned with the reason for an act of
payment by the corporation, not with the ultimate use of the funds by the
state, in enacting section 164(e). 78 Thus, the Court concluded that the di-
rect refund of taxes to the shareholders, rather than to the corporation, did
not require application of the tax benefit rule to negate the previous deduc-
tions taken by the bank because the corporation had not received a re-
fund.79 The majority pointed out that Congress probably did not intend to
deny the corporation a deduction if the state refunded the tax payments to
shareholders.80 The Court expressly rejected the Commissioner's conten-
tion that the refund to the shareholders was equivalent to a payment of a
dividend by the corporation and, as such, inconsistent with the original
cases cited by the majority, with the possible exception of Barnett, involved a recovery.
Stating that inconsistency alone has never been sufficient to invoke the rule, Justice Stevens
contended that the emphasis has always been placed on the presence of a recovery. Id at
1156, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. 398 U.S. 1 (1970). Nash dealt with the transfer of net accounts receivable from a
partnership to a corporation formed by the partnership members. The Commissioner deter-
mined that the partnership must include the amount of the bad debt reserve in income as the
reserve was no longer needed. The Supreme Court held the tax benefit rule inapplicable
because there had been no recovery by the partnership when it received stock worth only the
net value of the receivables. Id at 3-5. The majority in Hillsboro noted that Nash involved
neither a recovery nor an inconsistent event. Therefore, they argued, their present formula-
tion of the rule did not in any way conflict with the Nash decision. 103 S. Ct. at 1147 n.25,
75 L. Ed. 2d at 150 n.25. In dissent, however, Justice Stevens concluded that the opinion of
the Court could not be reconciled with Nash. Emphasizing the Court's use of the word
"recovery" in Nash, he argued that the Court had formulated a new doctrine when they
rejected the recovery theory in Hillsboro. Id at 1157-58, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 162-63.
74. 103 S. Ct. at 1144, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 147.
75. Id at 1144-45, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 147.
76. Id at 1147, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 150.
77. I.R.C. § 164(e) (1976).
78. Id at 1149, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 152 (citing Hearings on HR 8245 Before the House
Comm. on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 250-51 (1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax
Advisor, Treasury Department)).
79. 103 S. Ct. at 1149, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 153.
80. Id
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deduction.8 Arguing that the corporate tax laws do not permit the deduc-
tion of dividends, the Commissioner urged that the refund resulted in an
unallowed deduction. The Court observed, however, that in some circum-
stances a deductible dividend is contemplated by the Code.82 The Court
noted that the only effect of section 164(e) is to allow a corporation to take
a dividend deduction.83 On the basis of this analysis, the majority con-
cluded that the corporation is not required to recognize income on the
transaction by reason of the refund of taxes to the shareholders.
8 4
In resolving the issue in Bliss, the Court stated that when a corporation
expenses assets under section 162(a),85 the later conversion of the assets to
nonbusiness use is an inconsistent event that invokes the tax benefit rule
and requires the previous deduction to be included in income. 86 The
Court further stated, however, that this general rule will not always apply
when a Code provision shields the taxpayer from recognition of gain.
8 7
Because Bliss involved a nonrecognition provision, section 336,88 the
Court examined the history of the section 9 and concluded that section 336
does not prevent application of the tax benefit rule.90 Relying on Senate
and House Reports, 91 the majority concluded that section 336 is designed
to prevent recognition of market appreciation that has not been realized by
an arm's-length transfer to an unrelated party, rather than to shield all
types of income that might arise from the disposition of an asset.92 In
addition, the Court noted that courts have always applied the assignment
of income doctrine93 to distributions in corporate liquidations.94 The
Court therefore held that section 336 does not override the tax benefit
rule.95 The majority further held that section 337,96 the companion provi-
81. Id. at 1148, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 152.
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id. at 1149, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 153.
85. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 1978 & Supp. 1983).
86. 103 S. Ct. at 1150, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 153.
87. Id., 75 L. Ed. 2d at 154.
88. I.R.C. § 336 (West Supp. 1983).
89. The Court noted that the enactment of § 336 in the 1954 Code was, in effect, a
codification of the doctrine in General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200,
206 (1935). 103 S. Ct. at 1151, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 155. The doctrine provides that "a corpora-
tion recognizes no gain when it distributes appreciated property to its shareholders, whether
as a dividend or other distribution from an ongoing corporation or as a distribution in par-
tial or complete liquidation." Feld, supra note 33, at 444.
90. 103 S. Ct. at 1151, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 155.
91. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 258, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4621, 4678-80; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A90, reprinted in 1954
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 4017, 4063-64.
92. 103 S. Ct. at 1151, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 155.
93. The assignment of income doctrine prevents high bracket taxpayers from shifting
income to persons subject to a lower tax rate in order to reduce the overall tax burden on the
parties. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111,
114-15 (1930).
94. 103 S. Ct. at 1151, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 155 (citing Siegel v. United States, 464 F.2d 891
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 918 (1973); Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d
524 (Ct. Cl. 1961)).
95. 103 S. Ct. at 1152, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 156.
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sion to section 336,97 likewise does not override the tax benefit rule.98 Be-
cause Congress had apparently acquiesced in earlier cases applying this
construction of section 337, the Court concluded that Congress intended
similar construction for the corresponding language of section 336.99
These considerations led the Court to conclude that Bliss could not avoid
the tax benefit rule upon liquidation; therefore, the previous deduction was
includable in income to the extent of the cost of the grain on hand at the
time of liquidation.'°°
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the decision in
Hillsboro but dissented from the result in Bliss. 101 The benefits received
by the shareholders in both cases, Justice Stevens argued, should not result
in income to the corporate taxpayer.'0 2 Justice Stevens initially disagreed
with the Court's formulation of the purpose of the tax benefit rule. As he
construed the rule, the determinative factor is whether the taxpayer's
wealth has been enhanced by the later event, not whether earlier deduc-
tions were proper when viewed in the light of later events.' 0 3 Relying on
the two earlier Supreme Court cases construing the rule,1°4 Justice Stevens
concluded that application of the tax benefit rule requires a recovery. 10 5
He further stated that an inconsistent event was not, of itself, sufficient to
invoke the operation of the rule.' 0 6 Justice Stevens viewed the majority's
formulation of the rule as a rejection of the earlier decision in Nash v.
United States.'0 7 Contending that Nash requires a recovery, Justice Ste-
vens stated that the Court had established a new hybrid rule falling some-
where between the inconsistent event theory and the recovery theory. 0 8
The result, he claimed, was an uncertain and inconsistent interpretation of
the Code that would only complicate the tax system and increase litiga-
tion. 1°9 Justice Stevens argued that the proper approach to such a change
would be through congressional modification of the Internal Revenue
96. I.R.C. § 337 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983).
97. Id. § 336 (West Supp. 1983). The Court concluded that § 337 was enacted to create
the same consequences as § 336, that is, to allow a corporation nonrecognition of gain or loss
in a distribution in liquidation. 103 S. Ct. at 1153, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 157 (citing Midland-Ross
Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973); S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 91, at 258).
98. 103 S. Ct. at 1153, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 157. Among numerous authorities, the Court
cited Conerry v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972), and Commissioner v. Anders,
414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
99. 103 S. Ct. at 1153, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 157. The Court noted that Congress has made
changes in the liquidation provisions but has not changed the application of the tax benefit
rule to § 337 liquidations. Id
100. Id at 1154, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 158. The Court remanded for a determination of the
amount to be included in income. Id
101. Id. at 1163, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 170.
102. Id at 1154- 75 L. Ed. 2d at 158.
103. Id, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 159.
104. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489
(1943).
105. 103 S. Ct. at 1156-58, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 161-63.
106. Id at 1156, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 161.
107. 398 U.S. 1 (1970); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
108. 103 S. Ct. at 1161, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 167.
109. Id., 75 L. Ed. 2d at 166.
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Code. I0 Finally, Justice Stevens concluded that under his view of the re-
covery theory, the taxpayers in both Hillsboro and Bliss would not be re-
quired to include the benefits received by the shareholders in income."II
Justice Blackmun dissented from the conclusions reached by the Court
in both Hillsboro and Bliss. 112 In Hillsboro Justice Blackmun examined
the legislative history of section 164(e) and reached a different conclusion
than the majority. The focus of Congress in enacting section 164(e), ac-
cording to Justice Blackmun, was on the payment of a legitimate tax rather
than on the mere act of payment, as the majority had concluded." 3 If a
deduction is taken for tax payments and later events prove that no tax is
required, Justice Blackmun stated that a court must apply the tax benefit
rule. 14 Justice Blackmun's procedure for rectifying the undeserved tax
benefit, however, requires correction of the deduction in the year in which
it was claimed. 15 Since in Bliss and Hilisboro the later events occurred
within two days and two months, respectively, of the beginning of the fol-
lowing tax year, 16 Justice Blackmun urged that the most precise and accu-
rate adjustment would be to file an amended return for the year of the
original deduction.1 7 Because an amended return is the easiest and most
accurate way to adjust income, Justice Blackmun argued that the tax bene-
fit rule was never intended to be applied "in simple situations of the kind
presented in these successive-tax-year cases." 1 8
The fourth opinion, written by Justice Brennan, concurred with the ma-
jority in Bliss but dissented in Hillsboro.' 19 Although agreeing with the
majority's formulation of the tax benefit rule, Justice Brennan took issue
with the application of the rule in Hillsboro. Justice Brennan agreed with
Justice Blackmun's interpretation of congressional intent in enacting sec-
tion 164(e).120 He concluded, therefore, that an adjustment was necessary
110. Id. at 1163, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 169.
IlM. Id. at 1154, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 158. Justice Stevens argued that since neither corporate
taxpayer recovered its earlier expenditure, neither case involved a recovery giving rise to
taxable income. Id
112. Id. at 1164, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 170.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Id at 1165, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 172. This method, however, would contradict both well-
settled judicial policy and congressional enactments. See generally Burnet v. Sanford &
Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 363 (1931) (a recovery on judgment is required to be included in
income in taxable year in which received); Lexmont Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 185,
191 (1953) (refund of taxes deducted in prior years is includable in income in year re-
funded); South Dakota Concrete Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1429, 1432 (1932)
(recovery of embezzled amounts charged to expense in previous years is taxable income in
year of recovery); I.R.C. § 111 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (providing for exclusion of portions of
recoveries received during taxable year and implying nonexcluded portion is included in
income in year recovered).
116. In Bliss th., dairy adopted a liquidation plan on July 2, 1973, two days after the end
of the tax year in which the deduction was taken. In Hillsboro the Supreme Court decision
resulting in the tax refund was rendered in February 1973, only two months after the end of
the 1972 tax year in which the deduction was taken.
117. 103 S. Ct. at 1166, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 173.
118. Id




to the income of the bank in Hillsboro. 121
The Court's holding in Hillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy follows
the decisions in the Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals in re-
jecting an actual recovery requirement for application of the tax benefit
rule. The majority did not, however, expressly follow the inconsistent
event theory enunciated by those courts. The rule used by the majority
does not appear to differ from the formulation of the rule adopted by the
Sixth Circuit, but the Court refused to declare a blanket tax benefit rule to
be applied in all situations.'22 Each court should apply the rule only after
determining the purpose of the provision granting the original deduc-
tion.123 The Hillsboro cases formulate the required analysis that must be
followed in determining a proper application of the rule.
The Court also clearly indicated in the Hillsboro cases that the tax bene-
fit rule will not always override a nonrecognition provision in the Code. 124
The Bliss decision concludes that the rule overrides section 336, but makes
no conclusion as to other nonrecognition provisions in the Code. 12 5 An
analysis similar to that used by the majority is required to determine
whether the rule or the nonrecognition provision prevails when another
nonrecognition provision is at issue.12 6
The decision in these cases settles the disputes between the circuits as to
the proper formulation of the tax benefit rule and the application of the
rule in a section 336 liquidation. The Court's opinion in Hillsboro and
Bliss advocating a case-by-case analysis leaves open the possibility, how-
ever, that varying decisions will be reached by the different courts. In ad-
dition, when cases involving nonrecognition provisions other than sections
336 and 337 arise in different circuit courts, the opportunity for differing
results is enhanced.
III. CONCLUSION
In Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner the United States Supreme
Court determined that the tax benefit rule is properly invoked when events
occur that are fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier deduction. In
applying the rule, the Court emphasized that a determination must be
made of the legislative purpose in enacting the particular Code provision
giving rise to the taxpayer's original deduction. The Court held that the
tax benefit rule overrides the nonrecognition provisions of section 336,
based on the Court's interpretation of the underlying legislative intent. In
deciding whether the nonrecognition provision or the tax benefit rule pre-
vailed, the Court also relied on the desire for parity of treatment with sec-
121. Id.
122. Id at 1144, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 147.
123. d
124. Id at 1145, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 147.
125. Id at 1153, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 157.
126. The Court expressly stated that the decision in Bliss does not determine the outcome
in other cases, such as depreciation recapture under I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (1976 & Supp. V.
1981). 103 S. Ct. at 1145 n.20, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 147 n.20;see O'Hare, supra note 20, at 216-18.
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tion 337, which is overridden by the tax benefit rule. The effect of the
Hillsboro decisions is not to establish a broad general rule to be applied in
all situations, but rather to demonstrate the appropriate analysis to be fol-
lowed in future applications of the tax benefit rule.
Marjorie D. Arneson

